Russia is pushing into Africa with a cryptocurrency-based payments network designed to bypass Western financial infrastructure, using the continent as a testing ground for an alternative settlement system built around a ruble-backed stablecoin. The effort centres on A7, a digital financial platform that has attracted scrutiny from analysts, regulators and journalists for its ties to sanctioned entities and its opacity about actual operations on the ground.
The network is partly controlled by fugitive Moldovan banker Ilan Șor and Russia’s Promsvyazbank, a lender linked to the country’s defence sector, with the two entities holding stakes of 51 per cent and 49 per cent respectively. Payments are conducted using A7A5, a ruble-backed stablecoin that carries official recognition in Russia as a digital financial asset. The structure is deliberately designed to route international trade transactions outside the dollar-dominated banking system, from which major Russian banks were cut off following the country’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the subsequent disconnection from the SWIFT interbank messaging network.
A7 was founded in 2024, and a recent job vacancy in Togo sought a project manager to build a business “from scratch,” highlighting Russia’s ambitions to expand its alternative payment systems into West Africa. The recruitment notice, posted in Russian, was one of the few publicly visible signs of the platform’s continental expansion strategy.
A7 has also announced offices in Nigeria and Zimbabwe, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov described A7 as Russia’s “first international financial platform” at a Russia-Africa conference held in Cairo in December 2025. “Nigeria and Zimbabwe have already joined the platform. We invite all other African partners to follow their example,” Lavrov said. Promotional materials for A7 claim it handles up to 19 per cent of Russia’s foreign trade transactions, and Lavrov separately stated that 84 per cent of Russia’s trade with African countries between January and September 2025 was conducted in rubles, though neither figure can be independently verified.
The gap between Russia’s claims and verifiable reality is considerable. Elise Thomas, a senior researcher at the London-based nonprofit Centre for Information Resilience, said there is virtually no online footprint of the company’s activities in its claimed locations. Several cryptocurrency professionals in Nigeria and Zimbabwe told the Financial Times they were unaware of A7. In Zimbabwe, the company has been mentioned only once in a local newspaper, while in Togo there are no signs of its presence beyond the Russian-language job advertisement. Thomas told the Financial Times that A7 and its backers likely aim to “integrate their operation into the Kremlin’s larger strategic machine in Africa.”
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The financial initiative does not exist in isolation. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has actively developed alternative financial mechanisms including settlements in local currencies, barter arrangements and cryptocurrency platforms to sustain bilateral trade and military cooperation. This financial pivot coincides with a broader push to replace traditional Western influence in Africa, with Russia strengthening its presence in the Sahel region and beyond, deploying military instructors and signing new military cooperation agreements, including a recent pact with Togo’s longtime leader Faure Gnassingbé. The Kremlin’s strategy is to bundle financial, military and political engagement into a single integrated offer for African governments that are either resentful of Western conditionality or actively seeking to diversify their international partnerships.
Africa’s appeal as a testing ground for this strategy is not accidental. Several African economies maintain active trade relationships with Russia, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and energy, and payment systems that bypass dollar-based channels could simplify these transactions for governments and businesses that face their own difficulties accessing Western financial infrastructure. Many African nations also grapple with underdeveloped banking systems, currency volatility and limited access to cross-border payment rails, conditions that in theory make alternative systems more attractive. Russia’s Foreign Minister noted that 84 per cent of all trade between Russia and Africa utilised rubles in 2025, a figure that, if accurate, would represent a significant shift in the composition of bilateral trade finance.
Analysts caution, however, that ambition and execution are far apart. While A7 markets itself as a fast and uninterrupted payment solution, much of its network remains largely theoretical outside formal announcements. Videos of office launches and media coverage signal intent, yet local observers report minimal awareness of the platform. Regulatory clarity and consumer trust will ultimately determine whether viable platforms can take hold, and those associated with sanctioned entities are likely to encounter obstacles related to accessing global markets. For African governments that engage with A7 or similar systems, the risk is not only reputational but potentially legal, as secondary sanctions exposure for transacting with sanctioned Russian entities remains a live concern under United States and European Union frameworks.
