By Dr. Samuel Crabbe
This article begins a 24-part series on voter trust and voting intentions in Africa. The purpose of the series is to develop a clear, practical, and evidence-based way of understanding how trust is created, sustained, eroded, and restored within political parties, and why this process directly shapes whether citizens decide to vote for, against, or disengage from those parties.
Across the series, African political parties will be used as real-world case studies to show how internal organisation, ideology, emotional connection, and participation influence voter behaviour over time. The series is written to serve political science students, management and law students, party leaders, activists, analysts, and ordinary supporters who want to understand not just who wins elections, but why voters choose as they do.
At its core, the series makes one central claim: voter trust is the most powerful predictor of voting intention once identity, fear, and short-term incentives fade.
Across Africa, voter trust in political parties is weakening even where elections remain competitive and participation appears high. This decline is not mainly about poor campaigns or weak slogans; it is about whether parties consistently create emotional connection and ideological clarity through systems that voters experience as fair, inclusive, and predictable.
Voters do not decide their voting intentions in isolation or at the last minute; they form them gradually, based on whether they trust a party’s values, behaviour, and treatment of its own members. When trust is strong, voting intention becomes stable and resilient. When trust weakens, voting intention becomes volatile, conditional, or disappears altogether.

Recent electoral experience in Ghana illustrates this pattern clearly. Sharp shifts in support in urban and swing regions occurred alongside prolonged organisational neglect, declining participation, and perceptions of exclusion rather than sudden changes in voter ideology. Many voters did not immediately switch parties; instead, they first disengaged emotionally, reduced their participation, and became open to alternatives.
This gradual withdrawal shows how trust erosion precedes changes in voting intention rather than following them. By the time voting behaviour visibly changes, trust has often already collapsed.
Trust is often confused with popularity, but the two are fundamentally different. Popularity reflects short-term excitement, media attention, or campaign energy, while trust reflects long-term expectations about how a party will behave when pressure arises.
Emotional connection plays a decisive role because voters do not assess parties only by policy outcomes; they also ask whether the party recognises their dignity, voice, and belonging. When emotional bonds are strong, voters maintain their voting intention even during difficult economic periods or policy disappointments. When those bonds weaken, even technically competent governance struggles to translate into sustained electoral support.
Ideology gives emotional connection direction and durability. It explains why loyalty is deserved and what the party ultimately stands for beyond winning power. Where ideology is clear and consistently applied, it turns emotional attachment into stable voting intention by giving voters a moral reason to remain committed.

Where ideology becomes vague, opportunistic, or selectively enforced, emotional attachment thins and voting intention becomes transactional or unstable. This is why parties that abandon ideological clarity often experience sudden electoral shocks after long periods of apparent stability.
African political parties face a structural paradox that deepens this trust problem. They are most visible during elections but most consequential between elections, when internal rules are applied, leaders are selected, and ordinary members either feel included or ignored.
Trust is generated and sustained during these quieter periods through fair procedures, accountable leadership, and meaningful participation. When members experience fairness and voice inside the party, emotional connection strengthens and ideology becomes lived rather than rhetorical. This internal trust is then transferred outward to voters and shapes voting intentions at election time.
Historical experience in Ghana reinforces this insight. The decline of once-dominant parties did not occur because their founding ideas suddenly lost relevance, but because their internal systems failed to renew participation, emotional identification, and generational inclusion over time.
In contrast, parties that periodically reopen internal competition, re-engage members, and restate their ideological purpose tend to retain emotional resonance even after electoral defeat. Trust, once lost, therefore proves far harder to rebuild than campaign momentum or media visibility.

The most dangerous feature of trust erosion is that it is largely invisible while it is happening. Parties often interpret temporary electoral success as proof of legitimacy and ignore early warning signs such as shrinking participation, regional disengagement, or the concentration of decision-making in narrow circles.
Trust erosion is cumulative and nonlinear; once a tipping point is reached, voter intentions can shift rapidly and decisively. This explains why electoral defeats often feel sudden even though their causes have been developing quietly over many years.
Post-election patterns across Africa show how this process plays out numerically. Losses in urban and swing regions can almost mathematically neutralise traditional strongholds, demonstrating how emotional disengagement in one part of a country can outweigh ideological loyalty in another.
Urban youth and first-time voters, in particular, tend to disengage emotionally long before they change their voting behaviour or withdraw from elections altogether. By the time electoral collapse becomes visible, trust has already disappeared and voting intentions have already been reset.
These realities confirm that trust cannot be restored through louder messaging or more aggressive campaigning. Restoration requires deliberate organisational reform that reopens participation, clarifies ideology, and rebuilds emotional connection through fair and credible processes.
Reforms that broaden internal voting rights and reduce transactional politics should therefore be understood not as technical adjustments, but as trust-restoration mechanisms that directly reshape voter intentions by giving people a real sense of ownership and voice. In unequal societies, such reforms are as much moral interventions as political ones.
The next article moves from diagnosis to definition by addressing a foundational question for the entire series: what exactly is voter trust, how is it different from popularity, fear, or ethnic loyalty, and how does it translate into voting intention over time?
It will define voter trust in clear language, identify its core components, and introduce a practical framework that parties, students, and analysts can use to assess whether trust is being built, sustained, or quietly eroding long before an election exposes the damage.

About the author
Dr. Samuel Crabbe is a PhD graduate in Business and Management from the University of Bradford, specialising in blockchains and decentralized finance. He also holds an MBA in International Marketing from the International University of Monaco. Dr. Crabbe was the first president of the Ghana Business Outsourcing Association and pioneered Africa’s first large-scale data-entry operation as well as Ghana’s first medical transcription company. He can be reached via sammyomanye@gmail.com.